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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
DR. R. B. LINDSAY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
JENNIE WOODWARD, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
8492 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an appeal from a judgment allowing plain-
tiff's motion for a Summary Judgment against the 
Amended Counterclaim of the defendant and dismissing 
the same with prejudice. 
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As alleged in the Amended Counterclaim (R-9) 
defendant was injured in an automobile accident on or 
about 8 June, 1952, in or near Cokeville, Wyoming 
(Deposition pg. 2). Plaintiff is and was at the time of 
the accident a practicing physician in Montpelier, Idaho, 
(R-1) and was employed as such to care for plaintiff's 
wounds and injuries incurred and sustained in said acci-
dent (Deposition pg. 8-9) for compensation to be paid 
therefore. Plaintiff entered into said contract of employ-
ment in Wyoming on or about 8 June, 1952 (Deposition 
pg. 8). 
Defendant filed an action on 16 October, 1952, in 
Wyoming, against the driver of the vehicle with which 
she was involved in said accident seeking damages for 
personal injuries (R-14). Thereafter, 27 August, 1954, 
defendant settled said suit upon receiving $5750.00 for 
her injuries and signed a general release (exhibit B) 
releasing all persons from any and all claims, present 
and future, resultant from said accident. Pursuant to 
stipulations said case was dismissed with prejudice 
(R-22). 
Plaintiff brought an action against defendant in the 
City Court of Salt Lake County, Utah, to recover monies 
for professional medical services rendered defendant 
(R-1). On 7 September, 1955, a default judgment was 
entered against defendant (R-2) and defendant gave 
notice of appeal (R-3) 30 September, 1955. Having 
appealed to the Third Judicial District Court the defend-
ant Counterclaimed ( R-4) and later amended her 
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counterclaim (R-9) alleging malpractice and breach of 
contract and fraudulent misrepresentations and conceal-
ment (Deposition pg. 17, line 15; pg. 18, line 2; pg. 35, 
line 15; pg. 35, line 2; pg. 38, line 38; pg. 37, line 13; 
pg. 48, line 10; pg. 59, line 28) on the part of the plain-
tiff doctor. 
Plaintiff's motions to dismiss the appeal and to dis-
miss defendants counter-claim ( R -6) were denied ( R -8) . 
Plaintiff's motion for a Summary Judgment was 
allowed. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE DEFEND-
ANT'S CLAIM, AS SET FORTH IN HER AMENDED COUNTER-
CLAIM, WAS HERETOFORE COMPLETELY RELEASED AND 
DISCHARGED BY A V ALII> RELEASE EXECUTED AND DE-
LIVERED BY THE DEFENDANT ON OR ABOUT 27 AUGUST, 
1954. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING DEFENDANT'S CLAIM, 
AS SET FORTH IN HER AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM, IS 
BARRED AS AGAINST THIS PLAINTIFF BY THE JUDGMENT 
OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE MADE AND ENTERED IN 
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF LINCOLN 
COUNTY, STATE OF WYOMING, 27 AUGUST, 1954, IN THE 
CASE ENTITLED "MARY JANE WOODWARD, PLAINTIFF vs. 
L. K. OLSON, DEFENDANT." 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE CLAIM OF 
THE DEFENDANT, AS ALLEGED IN HER AMENDED COUNT-
ERCLAIM, IS BARRED BY THE PROVISIONS OF THE IDAHO 
STATUTE (1947) SECTION 5-219, AND BY THE PROVISIONS 
OF THE UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, TITLE 78-12-45. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE COURT HAS 
NO JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER SET FORTH 
IN DEFENDANT'S AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM AND THAT 
SAID AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM EXCEEDS THE JURISDIC-
TION OF THE CITY COURT OF SALT LAKE CITY, FROM 
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WHICH THE APPEAL IN THIS CASE IS TAKEN, AND HENCE 
IS IN EXCESS OF THE JURISDICTION OF THE DISTRICT 
COURT ON APPEAL FROM THE CITY COURT, AND THAT BY 
REASON OF THE MATTERS SET FORTH IN THIS PARAGRAPH 
THAT THE COURT OUGHT NOT TO ASSUME OR EXERCISE 
JURISDICTION AND HEAR AND DETERMINE THE ISSUES 
RAISED BY SAID AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM. 
ARGUMENT 
POINTS I AND II 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE DEFEND-
ANT'S CLAIM, AS SET FORTH IN HER AMENDED COUNTER-
CLAIM, WAS HERETOFORE COMPLETELY RELEASED AND 
DISCHARGED BY A VALID RELEASE EXECUTED AND DE-
LIVERED BY THE DEFENDANT ON OR ABOUT 27 AUGUST, 
1954. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING DEFENDANT'S CLAIM, 
AS SET FORTH IN HER AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM, IS 
BARRED AS AGAINST THIS PLAINTIFF BY THE JUDGMENT 
OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE MADE AND ENTERED IN 
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF LINCOLN 
COUNTY, STATE OF WYOMING, 27 AUGUST, 1954, IN THE 
CASE ENTITLED "MARY JANE WOODWARD, PLAINTIFF vs. 
L. K. OLSON, DEFENDANT." 
These two points are herewith treated together be-
cause of similarity in argumentation. The District Court 
and the jurisdictions which concur with its reasoning 
apparently reach their conclusion that the release of the 
original wrongdoer (by signed release or court action) 
releases the attending doctor from liability for malprac-
tice by treating the independent wrong doers as joint 
tortfeasors, or applying, by analogy, the common law rule 
of unity of discharge affecting joint tortfeasors. Mter 
listening to this argument and such variations thereof as 
the "but for" rule which holds that the release of the 
original tortfeasor releases all subsequent tortfeasors be-
cause the injured party would not have been further 
injured "but for" the actions of the original tortfeasor 
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(as advocated in a note found 40 A.L.R. 2nd 1075) the 
California Supreme Court holds in a well reasoned case 
of substantially identical fact situation, Ash v. Mortenson 
( 1944) 24 Cal 2nd 654, 150 P 2nd 876, wherein the 
plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident and re-
ceived medical treatment necessitated thereby; sued and 
settled with the negligent motorist and judgment was 
satisfied of record and plaintiff signed a general release; 
the following year plaintiff sued attending doctor for 
malpractice and in allowing such a suit the court said: 
(page 877) "The independent and successive acts 
of . . . (original tortfeasor) and defendant doctors, 
differing in time and place of commission as well 
as in nature, produced two separate injuries and 
gave rise to two distinct causes of action. Plaintiff 
was at liberty to sue ... for damages resulting for 
the original injury alone, and to sue defendant's 
for damages resulting from the additional injury 
or aggravation, in separate actions; and the order 
in which the actions might be brought would be 
immaterial. The plea of former recovery, there-
fore, involves a consideration of what the injured 
party did in fact recover in the action against the 
original wrongdoer rather than what she could 
have recovered therein ... " 
"In other words, defendants seek to substitute 
a rule of law for the factual defense of double 
recovery. The rule contended for has been adopted 
in numerous jurisdictions . . . But the conclusion 
that the release of the original wrongdoer releases 
the attending doctor from liability for malpractice 
has been reached by treating the independent 
wrongdoers as joint tortfeasors or applying, by 
analogy, the common law rule of unity of dis-
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charge affecting joint tortfeasors. The common 
law rule of unity of discharge is base? upon .the 
concept of a unity of a cause of action agamst 
joint tortfeasors and its application to the facts 
of the present ~ase would give the independent 
tortfeasors an advantage wholly inconsistent with 
the nature of their liability. Moreover the rule 
contended for . . . would stifle compromises, fav-
ored in the law, inasmuch as the injured person 
could not effect a settlement with the original 
wrongdoer without surrendering his separate cause 
of action against one who, by his independent 
tortious act, aggravated the injury." 
"A release of a cause of action against a wrong-
doer is not a release of a separate or distinct cause 
of action against another independent wrongdoer." 
In 1954 the California Court reaffirmed and 
strengthened its above stated position in Dickow v. Cook-
ingham ( 1954) 123 Cal App 2nd 81, 266 P2nd 63, 
wherein the plaintiff had signed a release and discharge 
of "all actions, claims and demands whatsoever, that may 
now or hereafter exist against ... on account of injuries 
to the person of . . . the undersigned, and the treatment 
thereof and the consequences flowing therefrom . . . " 
(Italics added) . The court agreed with the contention 
of the plaintiff (page 66) " ... that neither by its terms 
nor in fact did release apply to defendants (doctors)," 
and further states: 
(page 67) "We are of the opinion that the release 
of the original wrongdoer should release an attend-
~n~ do~tor from liability for aggravation of the 
InJury 1f there has been full compensation for both 
injuries, but not otherwise." 
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(page 68) " . . . parole evidence would be admis-
sible to determine the intention of the parties in 
giving and accepting the release . . . jury to pass 
upon them ... The release may be a bar to the 
present action, but its mere production does not 
constitute it such." 
The New Hampshire Court has recognized that the 
ancient common law approach is not only unrealistic but 
inequitable and holds that a release is not a bar to mal-
practice recovery in any event, but that compensation for 
the original damage may be a bar. Wheat v. Carter 
(1919) 79 N.H. 150, 106 A 602. 
(page 603) "In other words, the test to determine 
whether the release is a bar to his suit against the 
plaintiff (Doctor) is to inquire as to the extent of 
the claim he made at the time he settled with ... 
(original tortfeasor) . " 
In the instant fact situation the reasoning of the above 
case leads toward an equitable solution. The injured 
defendant testified (Deposition page 48 line 10) that 
she did not know until years after the settlement that her 
hip was injured and implies that her present hip injuries 
were caused by the doctor's negligence and further testi-
fies (Deposition page 59, line 28) that the plaintiff doctor 
concealed the true nature of her injuries from her. 
The Minnesota Court recognizes a liability upon a 
doctor by virtue of the relationship between the doctor 
and patient and holds in these settlement and release 
cases that an injured party should not be barred from 
collecting compensation for damages caused by a phy-
sician aggravating an injury, Viita v. Fleming ( 1916) 
132 Minn 128, 155 NW 1077. 
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(page 1 080) " . . . there is a liability on the part 
of the physician to the patient, it is a strain to hold 
that a settlement between the injured man and 
the wrongdoer for the in jury by the accident ... 
includes the claim that the injured man has 
against the physician for a separate and subse-
quent injury." 
Quite separate from this weight of authority by 
virtue of reason and equity there is virtual unanimity in 
decisions as pertaining to the liability of attending phy-
sicians in like cases wherein there is any evidence of a 
separate tort committed by the doctor. In the instant 
case several separate torts are alleged to have been 
committed by the plaintiff doctor. Whether or not a 
separate injury has been perpetrated on the injured 
patient is held to be a question for the jury. In a case 
wherein the doctor was sued for malpractice in caring 
for a leg that had been shortened by a previous accident 
and wherein the doctor claimed the plaintiff was barred 
because of a previous settlement on the accident case, 
M ainfort v. Giannestras ( 1951) 49 Ohio Ops 440, 111NE 
2nd 692, the Ohio Court held: 
(page 694) "If proven, they may present to the 
jury, under proper instructions, the question 
whether the negligence of the defendant (doctor), 
if any, merely aggravated the original injury or 
brought into existence an independant injury; in 
other words whether such consequences arise in 
any manner out of the accident originally com-
plained of and as a proximate and natural result 
thereof in an unbroken sequence. 
"If said injuries are found to be the result of a 
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distinct and independent wrong the release is no 
bar to this suit." 
In the case Cor bet v. Clark ( 1948) 187 Va 222, 46 
SE2nd 327, the plaintiff started action against a dentist 
for malpractice in treating injuries caused by a former 
dentist. The defense was that plaintiff had signed a re-
lease and had judgment in a previous case against the 
original dentist wrongdoer and it was contended ( 1) 
the acts of the first wrongdoer had produced inseparable 
injury to the plaintiff and (2) plaintiff could not state 
what specific in juries were inflicted by the respective den-
tists and thus only one cause of action. The court con-
cluded: 
(page 330) "Under this circumstance the release 
of the original wrongdoer should not effect plain-
tiff's right to recover damages for specific injuries 
which she now alleges were inflicted upon her by 
the gross negligence of Dr .... (defendant)." 
"These are rna tters of proof." 
In the instant case the defendant alleges that the plain-
tiff doctor committed the tort of fraudulent misrepresen-
tation and concealment to her damage (R-10) (Deposi-
tion page 18, line 2 ; page 35, line 15 ) . She claims further 
that she was separately injured by the plaintiff doctors 
actions and lack of actions (R-9) (Deposition page 48, 
line 10) . These are problems of proof and should not 
be stricken by summary action of the court. 
The very nature of the action brought by the 
amended counterclaim herein forbids the action of the 
District Court. 48 C.J. 1112 helps us to determine the 
nature of malpractice action by defining it as: 
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"ihe negligent performance of the dut~es which 
are developed and inc?IDbent upon him. (phy-
sician) on account of his contractual relationship 
with his patient." 
In a Connecticut malpractice suit wherein a death 
was caused by a blood transfusion of diseased blood, 
Giambozi v. Peters_ ( 1940) 16 A 2nd 833, the Court 
recognizes: 
(page 835) "An action for malpractice presents 
a claim of a hybrid nature. In one aspect, it may 
be viewed as based on negligence; in another 
aspect as based on breach of contract. 
(page 836) "The right of action for death, .. . 
was the result of a breach of contract to cure ... " 
This contract theory is generally recognized in the 
law. Even New York which follows the discredited ''but 
for" or "by analogy, joint tortfeasor" theory of unity of 
discharge holds in Bur v. Blumenthal (1938) 166 Misc. 
744, 2 NYS 2nd 246, wherein plaintiff was injured irt 
an automobile accident, signed a general release and 
later sued the attending doctor for malpractice: 
(page 247) "Satisfaction by the original wrong-
doer of all damages caused by his wrong bars 
action against the negligent physician who aggra-
vated the damage . . . This rule, which releases 
. . . (doctor) as a technical joint tortfeasor, can 
not be construed to release him from the contract 
claim contained in the third cause." 
In a case not in point but wherein a defense against 
a personal injury complaint was set up that plaintiff had 
theretofore sued ·another, Greenbalch v. Shell Oil Co~ 
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( 1935) Utah 78 F 2nd 942, the federal district court 
here gave this dictutn: 
(page 994) "We are not aware of any sufficient 
reason which should preclude a person who has 
sustained an in jury through the wrongful act of 
several persons from agreeing with one of the 
wrongdoers, who desires to avoid litigation, to 
accept such sum ... without releasing his cause 
of action as against the other wrongdoers." 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE CLAIM OF 
THE DEFENDANT, AS ALLEGED IN HER AMENDED COUNT-
ERCLAIM, IS BARRED BY THE PROVISIONS OF THE IDAHO 
STATUTE (1947) SECTION 5-219, AND BY THE PROVISIONS 
OF THE UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, TITLE 78-12-45. 
The Idaho Statute (1947), Section 5-219, alluded 
to in this point is a statute of limitations barring an action 
for personal injuries unless the same is instituted within 
two years after the date the cause of action accrued. 
Utah Code Annotated (1953) 78-12-45 bars an action 
in Utah if such action is barred in another state (R-15). 
Neither of said statutes can be reasonably construed 
so as to make them applicable to the defendant's amended 
counterclaim wherein defendant claims (R-10) that the 
plaintiff committed fraud and testifies (Deposition page 
35, line 15; page 48, line 10) that he concealed the true 
nature of her injuries from her and misrepresented her 
condition to her. Defendant further states that she did 
not discover the facts concerning this fraud until Novem-
ber, 1955 (R-10) (Deposition page 48, line 10). Indeed, 
the Statute which is applicable is Idaho Statute ( 194 7), 
Section 5-128 which reads: 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
12 
"An action for relief on the ground of fraud or 
mistake. The cause of action in such case is not 
deemed to have accrued until the discovery, by 
the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting the 
fraud or mistake." 
The Utah court reiterates this accepted rule of law that 
the statute of limitations does not commence to run until 
after discovery. In a malpractice suit in which a doctor 
left a broken knife in the plaintiff's throat and then repre-
sented to the plaintiff that the throat would clear-up, 
Peteler v. Robinson ( 1932) 81 U 535, 17 P 2nd 244, the 
court said in holding that the defense of the statute of 
limitations was not available because of the doctors con-
cealment: 
(page 250) "In courts of equity it is settled doc-
trine that a fraudulent concealment of a cause of 
action will postpone the operation of the statute 
of limitations until the discovery of the fraud, and 
by weight of authority the same rule prevails in 
actions at law." 
It should be noted that the plaintiff first treated 
defendant in the State of Wyoming (Deposition page 89) 
and it was there the contract was entered into. Restate-
ment of Conflict, paragraph 323 says: 
"In case of an informal unilaterial contract, the 
place of contracting is where the event takes place 
which makes the promise binding." 
It is alleged that defendant's damages, in part, stem from 
a delinquency in this contractual relation. Wyoming 
Statute ( 1945), Section 3-505, with relation to unwritten 
contracts of this nature, provides an 8 year statute of 
limitations. 
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THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE COURT HAS 
NO JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER SET FORTH 
IN DEFENDANT'S AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM AND THAT 
SAID AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM EXCEEDS THE JURISDIC-
TION OF THE CITY COURT OF SALT LAKE CITY, FROM 
WHICH THE APPEAL IN THIS CASE IS TAKEN, AND HENCE 
IS IN EXCESS OF THE JURISDICTION OF THE DISTRICT 
COURT ON APPEAL FROM THE CITY COURT, AND THAT BY 
REASON OF THE MATTERS SET FORTH IN THIS PARAGRAPH 
THAT THE COURT OUGHT NOT TO ASSUME OR EXERCISE 
JURISDICTION AND HEAR AND DETERMINE TRE ISSUES 
RAISED BY SAID AMENDED COUNTERCLAIM. 
The fourth paragraph of plaintiff's motion for sum-
mary judgment (R-12), and the subject matter of point 
4 herein, was not properly before the trial court in said 
motion. Prior to plaintiff's motion for summary judg-
ment plaintiff brought two motions: to dismiss appeal 
and to dismiss defendant's counterclaim (R-6). These 
motions in part were said to be "based upon the follow-
ing grounds: 1. This Court has no jurisdiction over the 
subject matter of the appeal. ... 5. The alleged count-
erclaim exceeds the jurisdiction of the City Court from 
which this appeal is taken, and hence exceeds the juris-
diction of this court on appeal from the City Court .... " 
The plaintiff's motions based upon the above stated 
grounds were denied by the court ( R-8). Said grounds 
are identical to paragraph four of the motion from which 
this appeal is taken ( R -12) . The court had previously 
ruled on the subject matter of paragraph four of plain-
tiff's motion for summary judgment and plaintiff's coun-
sel so stated to the judge at the time of hearing said 
motion and no argument was entertained thereon. Thus, 
any consideration of said paragraph by the court would 
be improper and error. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Appellant contends that she should not be barred 
from her amended counterclaim against respondent doc-
tor because of her release and judgment in a prior cause 
of action against the original tortfeasor. The complained 
of independent, successive acts of the doctor, differing 
in time and place of commission as well as in nature 
from the original wrong, constitute a separate cause of 
action. The injured party should be allowed to settle 
with one tortfeasor for the consequences of his acts, and 
another for the consequences of his. To deny this would 
deny adequate remedy to the innocently afflicted and 
save harmless a wrongdoer. 
In the instant case the doctor allegedly committed 
numerous independent torts producing much harm. ~ 
~-L/~J. • ~R9eBt should be allowed her day m court to present 
evidence of her claims. 
The nature of the cause of action, in part, is in 
breach of contract. This cause of action still exists and 
should be allowed to be heard. 
ifl'l'4-//4.&-f" 
~peaelent claims that she has been the victim of 
fraudulent misreprese~tation and concealment and that 
discovery of such was not had until November, 1955. 
Her cause of action commenced upon such discovery. 
J'he District Court ruled in favor of the defendant 
~jlell~,.. 
. ~eae@Rt when first confronted with the subject matter 
of paragraph four of plaintiff's motion for summary judg-
ment. To re-present this same material for consideration 
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to another division of the District Court would be im-
proper, and in point of fact was not done. To rule upon 
said material again would be error. 
· Appellant respectfully urges the Court to reverse the 
judgment of the trial court and permit her amended 
counterclaim against plaintiff respondent. 
Respectfully submitted, 
OSCAR W. McCONKIE, Jr. 
of the firm 
McCONKIE & McCONKIE 
Attorney for Defendant and 
Appellant. 
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